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Abstract 
On first reading, case 2016/A/4708 Belarus Canoe Association and Belarusian Senior Men’s 
Canoe and Kayak Team Members v International Canoe Federation, award of 23 January 
2017 (hereafter BCA v ICF) raises three familiar, deceptively simple, themes in anti-doping. 
Namely, the potential role of national criminal authorities in doping investigations; the 
relationship between those authorities and international sporting stakeholders; and the 
importance of those stakeholders adhering to their own rules when pursuing apparent anti-
doping allegations.  
This paper addresses those aspects in detail, but the case has a significance that goes beyond 
anti-doping. Specifically, BCA v ICF raises wider issues about anti-doping actors whose 
obligations under the WADA regime cannot be easily reconciled with their reliance on 
governments that use sports as a tool for cronyism and furthering political agendas. Such is 
the case in Belarus, where the relationship between a supposedly independent national anti-
doping authority and an ignoble and unhappy regime appears uncomfortably close. These 
concerns are compounded by sports federations who are only too happy to let Europe’s last 
dictatorship host their international events. 
1. Facts and Procedure of the Case
On 12 April 2016, French police and customs officials raided the training camp of the 
Belarus Canoe and Kayak team at Le Temple-sur-Lot, some 130km south-east of Bordeaux. 
Various substances, medications and materials that could be used for blood transfusions were 
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confiscated, along with 16 capsules of Mildronate (a brand name for meldonium) which were 
found in the room of the head coach of the women’s kayak team. Seventeen athletes 
underwent doping controls and five of the men’s teams urine samples tested positive for 
meldonium - which is used principally in the treatment of angina and other heart diseases but 
which “has been used by athletes in order to avoid damage to their heart after intense sport 
exercise.”1 The French authorities did not pursue the matter, choosing instead to pass their 
findings to the authorities in Belarus. On 15 June, the Belarus Canoe Association (BCA) 
notified the International Canoe Federation (ICF) that the positive tests for meldonium were 
to be treated as anti-doping rule violations (hereafter ADRVs), and the national anti-doping 
organisation (hereafter the NADO) had been notified of this in accordance with Article 14.1.2 
of the WADA code. However, the BCA went on to state: 
Due to the fact that WADA issued a Notice to Stakeholders regarding meldonium 
as well as guidance regarding the results management process, NADO Belarus 
with assistance of the Belarus Canoe Association conduct(ed) its own 
investigation regarding…the meldonium cases.2   
The BCA further reported that “all five athletes had established they had used meldonium 
prior to 1 January 2016…the concentration of meldonium in four samples causing such pre-
investigation anti-doping check is below 1000ng/ml, which means that results management 
may be stayed” in accordance with WADA’s meldonium notice to stakeholders.3  
The stakeholder notice (which is no longer valid) had been released by WADA on 13 April 
2016, 4 the day after the raid by the French authorities. It provided that, in cases where an 
athlete who was tested after 1 March 2016 claimed to have used meldonium before 1 January 
2016, a urinary concentration of below 1000ng/ml could lead to a finding of no fault in the 
absence of evidence that it was used after that date. 
On 11 July, the ICF wrote to the BCA referencing the June 30 letter and said the matter 
would be discussed at an emergency meeting of the ICF Executive Board in two days’ time. 
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It noted that under ICF anti-doping rules misleading, hiding or being found to be in breach of 
those rules could lead to sanctions on athletes, federations or officials and the imposition of 
financial penalties. While accepting that athletes who returned values for meldonium under 
1000ng/ml would normally be regarded as ‘clean’ under the WADA notice, it emphasised 
that there was an exception “where other evidence could be applied to those cases.” With that 
in mind, it said that the French criminal authorities had provided “concrete information and 
indications that your athletes and officials have offences regarding doping irregularities (and) 
misuse of medication,” and advised that the ICF was now pursuing its own case regarding 
violations of the anti-doping rules.5 Put another way, the ICF believed the additional evidence 
provided by the French authorities meant the initial finding of ‘no fault’ was unsatisfactory 
and had to be reviewed.  
The BCA was given 24 hours to respond, which it did robustly. In addition to raising general 
complaints about their treatment at the hands of the French, it noted that no subsequent action 
was taken by the criminal or anti-doping authorities, stated the coach who had the meldonium 
possessed it for his own purposes – to treat a longstanding heart condition – and said the 
transfusion equipment that was found in the raid was “intended for emergency use only.”6 
The BCA acknowledged that customs rules had been broken by its members transporting 
meldonium into France but said it would appeal to the CAS if the ICF’s Executive 
Committee imposed sanctions. It also revealed that it had been in text contact with the ICF’s 
Chief Executive prior to its emergency meeting. Upon hearing of the BCA’s intention to 
appeal, he had stated that “with these threats you will be aware that we will request even 
stronger penalties should we win or find more evidence.”7    
On 15 July, the ICF Executive Committee said all the athletes’ urine samples were consistent 
with meldonium being ingested after 1 January 2016 and that the possession of the 
meldonium tablets was an ADRV under Rule 2.6.2 of its anti-doping rules (possession of a 
prohibited substance or method). Possession of transfusion equipment and needles likewise 
amounted to a violation of Rule 2.6.2 and the possession of other substances, notably 
Actovegin (calf serum, which facilitates blood doping and under the WADA Code cannot be 
used as an intravenous infusion or injection of more than 100ml every 12 hours) and 
Cytoflavin (which is used in the treatment of concussion and ‘mild’ brain injury but is not 
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restricted at all), “indicate the intent or actual doping processes being carried out by these 
athletes.”8  
Rather than sanction individuals, the Executive Committee imposed a one-year ban on the 
men’s kayak and canoe teams in their entirety, ostensibly invoking Article 12.3 of the ICF 
anti-doping rules to take ‘additional disciplinary action’ on the ground that 4 or more ADRVs 
had occurred in a 12-month period. The teams’ places at the Rio Olympics were withdrawn, 
mandatory anti-doping training and at least three doping tests of all athletes over a 12-month 
period were imposed.9 True to its word, the BCA appealed to the CAS and asked that the 
decision be stayed and the hearing expedited so that, if successful, their athletes could 
compete at Rio. In its haste the BCA made significant errors which culminated in that request 
being rejected “because the appellants referred only to the criterion of irreparable harm but 
not also to the criteria of the likelihood of success and of the balance of interest.”10 Rule 37 of 
the 2016 CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration11 (which was the version in force at the 
time of the hearing) states that the panel chair “shall consider” all three of those elements in 
considering requests for provisional and conservatory measures. The BCA had thus erred by 
not addressing all three aspects and the request for a stay had been “clearly incomplete.”12  
The case was heard in November 2016, and it is immediately apparent that the ICF’s 
handling of the matter was fundamentally flawed. An initial, although not ultimately fatal, 
difficulty was that Article 42 of the ICF Statutes defines the disciplinary measures that can be 
imposed by the Executive Committee – namely, caution, reprimand and exclusion of some or 
all members of a national federation from competition – while suspensions fall within the 
competence of the Board of Directors.13 While the ICF contended that a ‘suspension’ could 
be meaningfully distinguished from an ‘exclusion’, the BCA argued that the two were 
different and the Executive Committee did not have the competence to impose the former. 
Alternatively, if it did have competence the Executive Committee had acted ultra vires 
because the potential sanctions had not been clearly defined: they were not based on proper 
rules and regulations, they were not predictable and there was no clear connection between 
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the behaviour and the sanction.14  Further, the BCA argued that the ICF could not impose 
‘additional’ measures under Article 12.3 of the anti-doping rules because there had been no 
initial sanctions imposed under Articles 12.1 or 12.2.15 It also argued that the WADA Code 
and the ICF rules (which reflect the Code’s terms) had been breached by the failures in the 
testing, analysis, investigation and results management processes and accordingly there had 
been no fair hearing. In fact, there had been no hearing at all because the whole process had 
been handled by the ICF secretary general and its lawyers rather than by a properly-
constituted anti-doping panel, and they had relied exclusively upon “vague information” 
provided by the French authorities. Nine of the athletes impacted by the team ban had not 
even been at the training camp, and the BCA said there were no grounds for sanctioning the 
team doctors, coaches and other members of the entourage.16 
In response, the ICF said that Article 42 of its Statutes gave its Executive Committee the 
authority to render a decision and use of the word ‘suspension’ rather than ‘exclusion’ was 
not decisive; the focus should be “not on the words used but on the effect of the appealed 
decision.”17 The decision’s consequence was not the blanket suspension of the BCA from all 
canoeing activities, but to prevent the senior men’s canoe and kayak teams from participating 
in international events. This, said the ICF, is exactly what Article 42(c) envisaged, and “even 
if the rules may be improved they are understandable and clear on their face.”18 That being 
so, there was no need for the Executive Committee to impose disciplinary measures under 
Articles 12.1 (withholding funding) or 12.2 (reimbursement of costs) of the Anti-Doping 
rules before ‘additional measures’ could be applied under Article 12.3. It sufficed that its own 
hearing had determine that four or more offences had been committed over a 12-month 
period. 
On that point, the ICF argued that “the mere presence of a prohibited substance is an anti-
doping violation” even though four of the five positive tests had apparently returned 
meldonium levels below the WADA threshold. It said the BCA’s explanation that the 
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meldonium was for the personal use of a team coach was not credible “in view of so many 
athletes found with this substance at the training camp.” Additionally, the fact that 
meldonium had been ‘prescribed’ by a team doctor with a background in paediatric medicine 
rather than by the coach’s personal physician, the argument that Actovegin was for a female 
athlete who had recently been diagnosed with a myocardial dystrophy, and the assertion that 
the transfusion systems were for ‘emergency use’ were given short shrift. “The ICF considers 
it established that members of the BCA connected to the senior men’s teams committed 
further anti-doping violations” in addition to the five positive tests. Article 12.3.1 had thus 
been properly applied by the Executive Committee, which “could have and might in future 
impose a suspension of the BCA’s membership for up to four years.”19 The ICF 
acknowledged that the decision to impose ‘additional sanctions’ had not been preceded by the 
imposition of any sanctions on anyone, but it contended that there had been no violation of 
procedural rights because the French National Anti-Doping Organisation, not the ICF, had 
been responsible for testing and results management. Further, Article 12 of the Anti-Doping 
rules “does not grant any hearing or procedural rights to the athletes and their entourage,” and 
“the athletes have not been punished as a direct consequence of their individual anti-doping 
violations, but because of their affiliation to the BCA’s banned team.”20 The fact that the 
BCA had admitted anti-doping violations on the part of individual athletes in its letter of 15 
June was also significant in encouraging the Executive Committee to proceed, as was “the 
refusal of the BCA to acknowledge any (institutional) wrongdoing.”21 
2. The Decision 
The CAS had to consider two principal points. First, whether the ICF Executive Committee 
had been entitled to impose the ‘suspension’; and second, if the answer to the first point was 
‘yes', whether the Executive Committee had violated its own rules and the procedural rights 
of the appellants in doing so.  
On addressing the first point, the CAS confirmed that Article 12.3 of the ICF Anti-Doping 
Rules did not specify which body was entitled to impose the various potential sanctions.22 
However, Article 42 of the ICF Statutes was clearer: exclusion of “some or all members of a 
national federation” from participation in competitions and the imposition of cautions, 
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reprimands and fines were decisions of the Executive Committee; suspension was a decision 
of the Board of Directors while expulsion required a vote of two-thirds of the ICF Congress.23 
The Panel agreed with the ICF that the one-year suspension of “the senior men’s canoe and 
kayak teams including coaches, medical staff and entourage for all international 
competitions” was not actually a suspension but an exclusion:  
A suspension may be decided by the ICF Board of Directors, a (partial) exclusion 
by the ICF Executive Committee…The Panel follows the arguments of the (ICF) 
in that the Executive Board erred in choosing the word ‘suspension’ but, in fact, 
wanted to apply and applied the measure of ‘exclusion’ and thus – in principle – 
used the competence applied to it by Article 42 of the ICF Statutes.24 
The decision to exclude had not erroneously referred to any of the grounds for ‘suspension’ 
laid down in Article 42.2, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary ‘suspension’ must be 
taken to have its generally-accepted meaning within sports federations - namely, that “use of 
all membership rights by the respective national federation or individual shall be prohibited 
for a certain period of time.”25 To that extent, the appellants were unsuccessful in arguing that 
the ‘suspension’ had been imposed by the wrong body. 
But the Federation’s difficulty with the second point proved insurmountable. To recap, 
Article 12.3 of the ICF Anti-Doping Rules established that it could only take ‘additional’ 
measures with respect to recognition, eligibility and fines if one of the four Article 12.3 sub-
clauses were engaged. In this regard, the Federation contended that Article 12.3.1, the ‘four 
offences in twelve months’ clause, had been operational. However, the CAS pointed out that 
12.3.1 requires “testing conducted by the ICF or anti-doping organisations other than the 
national federation or its national anti-doping organisation.” There had been no testing in 
compliance with that requirement (in part for reasons explored below) and, taken together, 
the unsatisfactory establishing of the facts and the absence of an anti-doping decision 
rendered by a competent body meant the Executive Committee’s decision had been 
“premature.”26 In any event, exclusions under Article 12.3 could be imposed only against “all 
officials” of the national federation. The ICF could not use Article 12.3 as a means of 
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sanctioning officials or athletes in some, but not all, disciplines which came under that 
federation’s authority. 
The Panels’ comments on the ‘unsatisfactory establishment of the facts’ merit closer scrutiny. 
First, on the burden facing the ICF with respect of meldonium use, it stated as follows: 
Having not been provided with evidence by the ICF to its comfortable satisfaction 
that the BCA athletes took meldonium after 1 January 2016, the Panel holds that 
there was no anti-doping rule violation as to meldonium. The reference to the 
WADA notice of 30 June does not exculpate the ICF from its obligation under 
Article 3.1 ICF ADR to demonstrate to the Panels’ comfortable satisfaction…that 
the prohibited substance entered the body of the athletes after 1 January 2016.  
In contrast, “the athletes fulfilled their obligation under Article 2.1.1. ICF ADR to make sure 
that no prohibited substance entered their body after 1 January 2016.”27 However, purporting 
to place the burden on the athletes in this way cannot be reconciled with the WADA Notice, 
which allowed for no-fault findings “in the absence of evidence that meldonium was used 
after 1 January 2016”28 but makes no comment about athletes bearing the burden. The case 
thus shows the difficulty in establishing to comfortable satisfaction that readings which were 
under the threshold were still a consequence of using meldonium after 1 January. That 
difficulty is also evident from the Panel’s holding that that the failure to establish meldonium 
use after the cut-off date applied also to the one athlete whose meldonium levels were above 
the threshold.29  
Perhaps the key factor in the Panel decision was the testimony of Professor Ivar Kalvins, the 
inventor of meldonium, who discussed the ‘slow phase’ of its excretion. The existence of a 
‘slow phase’ further muddies the waters on meldonium use and prohibition because it “can 
last for many months as the body tries to recapture (the ‘escaping’ meldonium)” and the 
length of excretion can be increased depending on weight loss, food consumption, the length 
of meldonium use and so forth.30  The Panel also referred to a recent scientific study which 
suggested that “all athletes who showed any concentration of meldonium had a genetic 
mutation.” While it was not persuaded by the argument that the Chernobyl disaster could 
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have contributed to the athletes’ excretion rates, it was satisfied that the ICF had failed to 
prove “the intake of meldonium by the five BCA athletes after January 2016.”31   
Neither was the Panel comfortably satisfied that the coach’s assertion that he had the 
meldonium for his own use was a lie. He had advanced an argument of sorts for his 
possessing it, and “there is no obligation for a therapeutic use exemption for coaches under 
the WADA Code or the ICF ADR.”32 So the sport’s anti-doping rules had not been violated 
even though the explanation might strike a casual observer as improbable. The Panel also 
found the explanation that the ‘transfusion kits’ were for use in emergencies only and taken 
to training sessions but never to competitions was “plausible and consistent” although the 
French authorities had found over 230 syringes in the course of its investigation,33 so they 
were clearly planning for the possibility of a devastatingly widespread and immediate need 
for them. Again, the ICF had failed to establish to comfortable satisfaction that the kits served 
the aims of prohibited methods, however. “The fact that (other experts) did not see a need for 
an emergency kit and never used such kit does not convince the Panel that (the team doctor), 
bound to a different legislation and medical culture, possessed such equipment” for 
illegitimate medical use.34 
The Panel then considered the ICF’s contention that the mere presence of a prohibited 
substance in an athlete’s body was an ADRV and there was no requirement for the Executive 
Committee to have first imposed sanctions under Article 12.1 or on individual athletes before 
it could utilise Article 12.3.35 It said, unsurprisingly:36 
The Panel finds that to follow such arguments would empty the competence of 
the ICF doping control panel, circumvent the system of distribution of powers 
laid down by the ICF Statutes and Anti-Doping Regulations and deprive the 
individual persons concerned of all procedural guarantees laid down by the 
WADA Code and implemented properly for the ICF by the ICF Anti-Doping 
Rules. 
The role of an ICF doping control panel might become limited to rubber-stamping decisions 
taken by the Executive Committee, but it would also “lead to disaster” if a panel were to 
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subsequently investigate and find there had been no individual ADRV after the Executive 
Committee had decided there was and had imposed sanctions.  
The Panel’s decision on the merits was entirely proper, but its opinion that the establishing of 
“independent judicial bodies” to replace political bodies deciding on ADRVs was “one of the 
essential achievements of the WADA Code”37 does not withstand scrutiny given the wider, 
political, issues of the case that are discussed below. Prior to the CAS’ inception in 1984 and 
WADA’s creation in 1999, appeals against sports’ decisions on ADRVs usually fell within 
the jurisdiction of domestic civil courts,38 and this inevitably gave rise to challenges that have 
been widely-documented and led to proposals for reform. Indeed, the CAS website notes that 
“at the beginning of the 1980s, the regular increase in the number of international sports-
related disputes and the absence of any independent authority specialising in sports-related 
problems and authorised to pronounce binding decisions led the top sports organisations to 
reflect on the question of sports dispute resolution.”39 CAS’ creation was a response to the 
cost and complexity of litigation and the inevitability of different outcomes arising in 
different jurisdictions as a result of genuine “judicial bodies” carrying out their proper 
functions.  
The case reminds us that sports dispute resolution is susceptible to political interference 
notwithstanding the undoubted benefits it brings because these entities are not truly 
‘independent’ and there is the potential for improper influence. It was absolutely right that the 
appealed decision was “fully cancelled”40 but the argument that these tribunals are ‘judicial 
bodies’ should be approached with caution. The German Federal Court of Justice’s ruling in 
DESG and ISU v Pechstein41 is a useful explanation of why the CAS can be properly 
regarded as ‘independent’ and might be perceived as a ‘judicial body.’ But neither the CAS 
nor the international federations can have oversight of all the decisions taken by national anti-
doping bodies, and the wider sports law and policy community needs to be vigilant when 
confronted with decisions that seem tainted by political interference. BCA v ICF is a 
paradigm example of this because further investigation of Belarus’ anti-doping apparatus 
confirms it is not independent of the state either in fact or in law. To the contrary, it is a tool 
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of government which has the clear potential to serve wider the political aims of an oppressive 
regime rather than the goal of clean sport.  
3. State Actors, Convention Obligations and Anti-Doping 
In many, perhaps most, countries the anti-doping industry’s reliance on state funds does not 
fatally compromise its integrity because it is sufficiently at arms’ length from government 
and sufficiently transparent in its operations. Thus, it allows athletes and other stakeholders a 
high degree of confidence in its independence or,42 failing that, the opportunity to offer 
informed criticism about its links with the state should their de facto independence come into 
question. Other than funding the work of anti-doping actors, nation states’ contributions 
derive not from the WADA Code directly but from national laws, which invariably have their 
origins in the two international anti-doping instruments, the Council of Europe Convention43 
(which pre-dates the WADA Code) and the UNESCO Convention (which post-dates it). The 
nature and extent of state parties’ legal obligation rests on whether those instruments’ 
provisions have been incorporated into national law or otherwise form the basis of anti-
doping policy in accordance with Article 6 of the UNESCO Convention and Article 1 of the 
Council of Europe Convention.  
In addition, states ratifying the Council of Europe Convention commit themselves to 
participating in the monitoring processes established by Articles 10 and 11. The national 
reports that are part of that monitoring process provide both a mechanism for scrutinising 
their independence and an insight into what is actually happening in those countries, 
representing an examination of ‘law on the ground’ as opposed to ‘law in the books’, to adopt 
the language of legal consciousness.44  They are particularly pertinent here because they show 
how concerns which pre-date the BCF case still have implications that go beyond the world 
of drugs and sports and ought not to be considered in isolation. 
The Council of Europe Convention calls upon signatory states to “undertake, within the limits 
of their respective Constitutional provisions”45  the steps necessary to comply with it and to 
                                                             
42 Department of Culture, Media and Sport, Tailored Review of UK Anti-Doping, January 2018.  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/677496/Tailored_Rev
iew_of_UK_Anti-Doping_-_Final_Version_for_Publication_.pdf; Philip Clemo, Funding, Independence and Effectiveness. 
Key Points from the Government’s Tailored Review of Anti-Doping, 27 June 2018. 
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/item/funding-independence-and-effectiveness-key-points-from-the-
government-s-tailored-review-of-uk-anti-doping. Accessed 30 April 2019. 
43 ETS 135, 16 November 1989; Ed 2005/Convention Anti-Doping Rev. 
44 Hertogh and Kurkchiyan 2016. 
 
“co-ordinate the policies and actions of their government departments and other public 
agencies concerned with combatting doping.”46 France, the first state actor involved in this 
case, ratified the Convention in 1991 by means of the Ratification Act 19-1144 and has since 
passed a number of acts, decrees and implementing orders designed to give effect to it. The 
National Anti-Doping Agency is now the key authority. It is arms-length from government 
although dependent on it for funding, and there have always been important roles for state 
actors including the customs bodies and national police authorities.47 The raid at Le Temple-
sur-Lot is a particularly robust example of a state having laws and policies that reflect its 
obligations under Article 4(1) to adopt measures to control the movement, possession, 
importation, distribution and sale of doping agents and methods – and of those instruments 
being accompanied by a political willingness to use them. Horta et al’s Report into French 
compliance with the Convention explained how the French Public Health Code lays down 
extensive criminal sanctions for doping-related offences and gives various organs the 
authority to carry out raids to facilitate compliance.48 The Police Judicaire, acting under the 
authority of the Criminal Code, ordinarily carries out the role while overseen by a judicial 
authority, and “seizures may be made if authorisation is given by the President of the 
Regional Court or by a specially-delegated member of the court.”49 This is precisely what 
happened with the Belarus paddle athletes.  
It is also notable that Council of Europe Convention Article 8(2)(c) requests state parties “to 
initiate bilateral and multilateral co-operation between their appropriate agencies, authorities 
and organisations in order to achieve, at the international level as well, the purposes set out in 
Article 4.1.” France and Belarus had signed a bilateral agreement in December 1995,50 four 
years before WADA was created, and the global growth of such agreements around that time 
“constituted, in effect, public recognition by governments of both the ineffectiveness of IOC 
policy and the need for governments to introduce more effective anti-doping policy.”51 
WADA has since commended bilateral agreements as part of “developed 
NADOs’…responsibility to assist NADOs in the process of their development”52 and its 2014 
guidelines suggested that they could “generate a wide range of benefits including establishing 
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international benchmarks for best practice, sharing solutions of practical issues, building anti-
doping competence and professionalism, improving quality management and improving 
information exchange…. Suggested foci for collaboration include how to initiate cooperation 
with national sports organisations, how to establish a NADO and how to develop an annual 
doping control programme.”53 Perhaps the French passed their evidence to the Belarusian 
authorities in this spirit of bilateralism and cooperation, or perhaps they did not think the time 
and resources required to pursue it was merited. Or maybe they simply wanted to emphasise 
that they possessed both the legal basis and the political will to raid other countries’ training 
camps if they wished, without particularly caring what happened next. 
At the end of their Report into French compliance, Horta et al concluded, “we must 
hope…that the signing of a global Convention under the auspices of UNESCO will lead to a 
more widespread use of the foundations laid by the Council of Europe Convention.”54 That 
Convention,55 signed in October 2005, sought to “promote the prevention of and the fight 
against doping in sport, with a view to its elimination.”56 As with the Council of Europe 
Convention, it requires state parties to “adopt appropriate measures at the national and 
international level” to encourage all forms of international cooperation aimed at protecting 
athletes and ethics, and to foster cooperation with WADA in particular. There are thus in 
place two international Conventions which have very similar provisions. Both have been 
signed and ratified by France and Belarus, both countries have been the subject of 
compliance reports under the Council of Europe Convention, and both countries participate in 
the biannual conference of parties to the UNESCO Convention.57 That is where the 
similarities end. 
4. Back in the USSR 
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The Monitoring Group for the Council of Europe Convention visited Belarus in November 
2014, shortly after the country’s new National Law on Physical Culture and Sports came into 
force, and its Report was submitted a year later.58  
Signatory states are required to submit auto-evaluation report on compliance with the 
Convention prior to visits from the Monitoring Group. In compiling theirs, the authorities in 
Belarus said this new law was in conformity with the WADA Code and WADA international 
standards59 and said that the NADO “ensures all stages of doping control, except laboratory 
analysis and appeal review”60 as required under Article 3 of the Convention. On concluding 
its own inquiry, the Evaluation Team declared that Belarus was “only partially” fulfilling the 
political commitment expected under Article 1 because the national law did not define the 
obligations of government departments and public bodies with regard to anti-doping. It 
recommended reform so that “the obligations of the NADA, the country’s sports 
organisations and the government departments and public bodies…be defined.” It also called 
on Belarus to ratify the Additional Protocol on mutual recognition of doping controls, which 
in principle allows WADA to conduct out-of-competition tests in the signatories’ territory - 
although one imagines that very exceptional circumstances would have to arise before 
WADA is persuaded to use its limited resources to do this. In any event, Belarus ratified the 
Additional Protocol in December 201661 and there was testing of its athletes’ samples at 
accredited laboratories after June of that year in the run-up to the Rio Olympics,62 but the 
Evaluation Team had other reservations. These included the national law’s over-broad 
definition of “athlete” as “any person getting sports training on a chosen sport” which created 
an “unduly heavy obligation” to control purely casual participants when the priority should 
be “on the (elite) level of sportsmen and sportswomen where doping is known to exist.”63 It 
was especially concerned that the NADO was not at arm’s length from the state but was 
clearly a governmental organisation, presciently noting that this “raises concerns about the 
independence of…its operations and decision-making processes” given that the NADO relied 
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exclusively on the state for the funding of testing, education and all other functions. It 
recommended that the NADO “should have sufficient budget and administrative/operational 
autonomy to conduct testing and its other core activities, and this should be reflected in, and 
secured by, legislation” which removed the possibility of government pressure and conflicts 
of interest.64 Perhaps matters have got worse since the Evaluation Team’s visit, but in light of 
BCA v ICF it cannot currently be regarded as ‘independent.’ 
Other concerns about the state’s role in anti-doping arose from the Evaluation Team’s 
comments on the advanced state of Belarus’ pharmaceutical industry and the government’s 
links to it. It discovered that “currently, 28 pharmaceutical companies operate in Belarus, 
producing medicines for the Belarusian market and for export to many other countries, and 
the pharmaceutical industry is regulated by the Ministry of Health, which also has 
responsibility for overseeing the industry’s work”65 as well as controlling anti-doping efforts. 
Co-operation between the pharmaceutical industry and anti-doping authorities is an important 
aspect of the Council of Europe’s anti-doping strategy,66 but there was an implicit concern 
about the symbiotic relationship between the industry and government. Given what is known 
about individuals who have roles in the industry, government and sport (as explored below), 
the concern that this relationship might impact anti-doping activities is by no means fanciful. 
There were also considerable delays in the sharing of data between government agencies, 
customs and police authorities and the NADO, which seemed to be last in the queue for the 
receipt of information.  
Lastly, although the NADO’s draft 2015 rules allowed it and other anti-doping organisations 
to carry out reciprocal testing of athletes within their jurisdiction, “there are no official 
agreements in place between the Belarusian authorities or the sport organisations of Belarus 
and other national anti-doping organisations or international federations for the testing of 
athletes from Belarus when training in other countries.”67 The Evaluation Team said that 
those draft rules could not come into force until WADA had approved them, so the 2014 
rules had to remain in force and these were not WADA compliant because they did not meet 
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the approved definition of ‘doping’ or adhere to the WADA sanctions regime. It said that “the 
Belarusian authorities are strongly advised to solve this issue as a matter of urgency.”68  
There were also significant concerns about the laboratory used in Belarus for sample analysis. 
It had been accredited domestically for the purposes of ISO/IEC 17025, which is the 
international standard applicable to all laboratories that carry out tests and calibrations,69 but 
that accrediting body was not a full member of the International Laboratory Accreditation 
System as required by WADA’s International Standard for Laboratories.70 In 2013, WADA 
decided not to approve any more laboratories in Europe, and although in 2014 the Belarus 
laboratory had sought approval for the purposes of the athlete biological passport, this was 
rejected on the ground that “much remains to be done in sample collection capacity 
development and consolidation of NADO activities” before WADA could consider any 
accreditation requests.71 Its limited accreditation by the non-compliant national registering 
body did not extend to a range of banned products including ‘threshold’ substances, it was 
not accredited for the detection of erythropoietin or human growth hormone and it was never 
going to receive accreditation without being awarded ‘probationary’ status. The NADO’s use 
of a non-accredited laboratory thus “constitutes a non-conformity with the provisions of the 
(Council of Europe) Convention and an element of non-compliance with the Code” and the 
Evaluation Team recommended that it should cease sending samples to the Belarus 
laboratory - which implicitly meant it would start sending them to Russia, which seems to be 
no solution at all.72 It advised that it should put more effort into developing the NADO and 
laid down a series of steps the laboratory would have to take “in case” it ever gained 
probationary status. This would culminate in ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation by an international 
authority rather than the questionable national one.73 But this all reinforces the inescapable 
conclusion that the authorities in Belarus could not have properly tested the paddle athletes’ 
samples without sending them to Russia or, perhaps, Germany. There is no evidence that this 
happened and it is notable that the CAS Panel did not discuss the actual levels of meldonium 
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in the samples save to repeat the Belarus authorities’ assertion that it was below the threshold. 
One is entitled to ask ‘how did they know?’ because the only evidence that the samples were 
below the threshold was the contents of the BCA’s letter to the ICF of 15 June 2016. All that 
is known for sure is that five of the samples taken from seventeen athletes by the French 
authorities on 12 April 2016 tested positive for meldonium. Beyond that, the evidence was 
scant and self-serving in favour of a regime that also made no provision for members of the 
disciplinary tribunals to be independent of the NADO, where national federations had the 
power to review tribunals’ decisions before they were confirmed and where there was no 
guaranteed right to a fair hearing, to be represented by counsel or to present evidence as 
guaranteed by the Convention.74 The Evaluation Team warned that the failures “exposes 
Belarus to concerns that its national anti-doping programme could be used to supervise 
doping as opposed to deterring and detecting it.”75 Belarus replied that it was “working 
towards cooperation” with UK anti-doping and while this had certainly been the case in 2013, 
there is no subsequent mention of that relationship on the UKAD website.76 Undaunted, the 
Evaluation Team encouraged it to pursue that relationship and to work more closely with the 
Monitoring Group and with other countries, in order to help address its concluding concern: 
The Belarus national anti-doping programme is too isolated from the anti-doping 
programme of other major sporting countries. This limits access of the NADA to 
anti-doping innovation and best practices. (It) has little experience with non-
analytical ADRVs (such as those committed by a coach or sport doctor).77     
Although it felt the political commitments had been met, the Report concluded that “Belarus 
has not yet satisfactorily fulfilled the Anti-Doping requirements under the Convention.”78 It 
should be noted, however, that as of the 2017 biannual meeting it was not in the list of states 
deemed non-compliant with the UNESCO Convention.79 This raises questions about the 
utility of the Convention’s monitoring arrangements rather than assuaging any concerns 
about Belarus, and perhaps the next evaluation will address some of those worries; but for the 
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reasons outlined below, future analysis of doping in the country ought to be informed by 
considerations that go far beyond sport. 
5. Towards a New Perspective on Sport, Doping and Human Rights 
In 2004 the European Union Council, mindful of the rigged elections, the disappearance of 
political opponents, the endemic corruption and the steady erosion of human rights in the 
country since Alexander Lukashenka became President in 1994,80 adopted the first of 
numerous Common Positions to prevent the passage through the member states of 
government officials and other persons it deems responsible for human rights abuse and 
corrupt practices.81 This was significant because Lukashenka, who is also the President of the 
National Olympic Committee, was denied a visa to attend London 2012 as a consequence of 
those measures.82 Thereafter, a host of other Common Positions and Regulations placed 
further restrictions on, and froze the assets of, people close to his regime.  
All this is relevant because “sport under Lukashenka has been hugely important to national 
prestige”83 and the relationship is symbiotic. Chelsea FC Chairman Roman Abramovich has 
invested heavily in its energy and pharmaceutical industries,84 Champions League sponsor 
Gazprom was given 50% of the national energy supplier between 2007 and 2010 in murky 
circumstances85 and the Kremlin recently depicted the two Presidents playing together in an 
ice hockey match that their side diplomatically won 16-1,86 which was a winter coup for 
Lukashenka given that the countries’ relationship is often soured by energy wars.  
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One of the Common Positions mentioned above, Decision 2012/36/CFSP,87 froze the funds 
of Yury Chyzh whose business empire had given financial support to the regime in return for 
lucrative government contracts in the gas and oil industries. Chyzh has held several 
prominent sporting positions, including Chairman of the Belarus Wrestling Federation and 
President of Dinamo Minsk Football Club, which enjoys an infamously right-wing fanbase. 
He is known as ‘Lukashenka’s Wallet’88 One of Chyzh’s other business interests, 
TriplePharm, is part of the extensive pharmaceutical industry documented by the Monitoring 
Group. In Dinamo Minsk v Council89 and Chyzh v Council,90 the application of the Common 
Position to the club and to Chyzh personally were annulled because the procedure had 
violated the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Article 47 and the principle that “the 
statement of reasons for an act… must identify not only the legal basis of that measure but 
also the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers, in the exercise of its 
discretion, that the measure must be adopted in respect of the person concerned.”91 This has 
allowed the club to participate in every Europa League season since 2012, but Chyzh is not 
the only friend of Lukashenka to have extensive sporting interests. “Functionaries of the 
government, heads of security structures, and business elites from the circle of Lukashenka 
also serve as heads of sports federations. Chief executives of football clubs are also recruited 
from the regional political elites and managers of state businesses.  Sponsorship of football 
clubs is carried out by municipalities and regional budgets, by state enterprises and 
business.”92 Every recent UN Treaty Committee report has noted significant human rights 
violations by the regime and its associates,93 but the relationship between sports and the 
regime goes beyond individuals in Belarus with their snouts in the trough: a host of 
international federations are also tucking in contentedly.  
Belarus is the only European country to use the death penalty.94 It ranks 155th out of 180 
countries for press freedom – thus placing it slightly above Iraq but below eSwatini, formerly 
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Swaziland.95 In 2018 the UN Human Rights Council appointed a new special rapporteur for 
the country and extended her mandate in the light of her predecessor detailing “a purposefully 
repressive legal framework, aggravated by regularly recurring, centrally planned violent 
crackdowns on peaceful demonstrators, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), political 
opponents, human rights activists and independent media workers.”96 In the late 1990s over 
thirty political opponents and journalists were murdered or simply disappeared,97 and in 2017 
after several years of relative calm over 150 journalists and human rights activists were 
arbitrarily detained, 60 foreign journalists arrested, three bloggers were charged with the 
criminal offence of “sowing social discord between Russia and Belarus,” and new anti-LGBT 
laws were passed. Human Rights Watch has also noted that “European governments and 
institutions continue to strengthen relations with Belarus despite a lack of tangible rights 
improvements” and stated that the country “has a long record of human rights abuses and 
violations of media freedoms connected with major sports events.” This goes some way to 
explaining why the rise in event-hosting has coincided with a new clampdown on human 
rights since Lukashenka won the rigged 2015 Presidential election with an improbable 83.4% 
of the vote.98 In 2017, this country with a population of under ten million hosted more than 
seventy world- or Europe-wide events in sports including fencing, skiing, wrestling, judo, 
track cycling, speedskating, taekwondo, table-tennis and powerlifting.99 In 2018 it hosted 75 
events in more than thirty sports and in 2019 the number topped 100 for the first time.100 In 
addition to these individual events, Minsk will host the June 2019 European Games, having 
been awarded them by the European Olympic Committee in 2016.101 The EOC has been 
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assured that the media will have “free access” to the Games,102 but in a country where 
journalists are regularly imprisoned, the President has a personal fortune of over $11 
billion103 and political opponents disappear, that rather misses the point.  
6. Conclusion: Taking Rights Seriously? 
There are legitimate arguments that sports’ engagement in countries with despotic regimes 
can perhaps be a force for good,104 and there is some evidence of the EOC asking awkward 
questions as the Games approach.105 But the President has also said that Belarus athletes are 
“obliged” to do well at the competition and that children, the elderly and those with 
disabilities should be “invited, not forced to attend…to ensure the stands are full.” Concerns 
about whether Belarus has a laboratory capable of testing for meldonium or whether the 
sports media can accurately report who wins the beach soccer are irrelevant if they are not 
placed in this wider context. Similarly, if Belarus has improved its anti-doping procedures 
one might reasonably expect evidence of this in the European Games, but one also worries 
about how national athletes will respond to pressure from a populist despot who says that 
“the people are tired of waiting for results.”106 In both respects, whether international actors 
have the inclination, the resources and the opportunity to closely enquire into what their new 
best friends in Minsk are up to remains to be seen, but one should not expect too much 
because the overtures of sports organisations have not come with strings attached. WADA, 
the Convention Monitoring Group and those countries who have signed bilateral 
arrangements might be able to influence the anti-doping landscape, while perhaps the news 
media, event sponsors and those National Olympic Committees who considered boycotting 
Minsk 2019 can work behind the scenes on the wider human rights issues, but the two should 
operate in tandem. Human rights groups and academics also have a role to play.  
To conclude by returning to the case, the ICF was probably trying to do the right thing but 
acted hastily when confronted by a national federation and a national anti-doping agency 
which inspired little confidence. If one accepts Prof Kalvin’s assertion that meldonium “is 
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very safe and has very mild side-effects, there were less (sic) than 90 serious events,”107 one 
is once again left wondering why it is banned at all and it is possible that meldonium will be 
allowed out-of-competition in a few short years. If that happens the decision in BCA v ICF 
will still be important, for it sheds light on a particularly grubby aspect of sport in a country 
that too often flies under the radar and provides a window on a world far beyond anti-doping. 
The kayakers and canoeists of Belarus, and the coach with the bag of meldonium, have done 
the sport and human rights community a considerable service.  
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